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An Interview with Jean Ricardou: 
"How to Reduce Fallacious Representative Innocence, 
Word by Word" 
Answers to a Questionnaire by Michel Sirvent 
1. Doesn't Le Thdatre des metamorphoses explore the practical 
consequences formulated by Barthes when he concluded that "the 
theory of the text can only coincide with a practice of writing" 
assuming that a "theory of the text cannot be satisfied by a 
metalinguistic exposition " ('From Work to Text" 164)? 
Allow me a preliminary remark. The trouble you take to 
approach certain aspects of my work by calling forth an opinion that is 
supposed notorious by Roland Barthes presents an advantage and a 
disadvantage. The advantage? This is, of course, in establishing what 
is known in order to go towards what is supposed to be less known. 
The disadvantage? Through this premise, one is led to presume a type 
of origin. I must therefore avert any possible misunderstanding 
without delay: none of my books, and in particular, Le Theatre des 
metamorphoses, is of a Barthesian obedience. 
Undoubtedly, from a distance, various indications can point to a 
sort of concordance, relatively speaking, of course, between the 
appealing essayist and the minimal writer I happen to be: they are 
deceptive. Here are two of them. 
The first, how might I put it, belongs to a literary milieu: we are 
familiar with Barthes' closeness to Tel Quel, a review on whose 
editorial committee I sat until my departure in 1971. Yet it is worth 
simply understanding that my thought, then in the process of being 
formed, at that time was not consolidated enough to allow me to enun- 
ciate several disagreements which were then growing. 
The second sign is, if you will, of a lexical order: the sentence you 
recall includes the occurrences "text," "ecriture," that are found no 
less frequently beneath my pen. But it is preferable to grasp that they 
are far from bearing the same concepts in both cases. I have the 
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fault of thinking that these notions in Barthes-which are often 
claimed in an openly metaphoric status-are too fleeting to serve as 
precise instruments of examination, and that they tend to possess, on 
the contrary, a certain operational vigor in my work, especially my 
most recent, because they are articulated in an analytical ensemble 
where their metaphorical tenor dwindles. Thus in the article that you 
quote, Barthes affirms that "the text must not be understood as a com- 
putable object," whereas for Textics-this discipline that today I am 
elaborating with an informal group of a few other researchers-the 
text understood technically, which is something a little bit different, 
pertains to what is calculable in its structures and their effects, even if 
it is difficult to control it completely from this angle. 
The experimentation of Le Theatre des metamorphoses comes, 
to tell the truth, from further away: from an effort, apparent in my first 
volumes, to problematize fiction by confronting it in various ways 
with an emphasis on the ecrit that permits it. To be brief, let us say that 
this approach is indicated in the title itself of my second novel, 1965, 
which divides itself, on the one hand, La Prise de Constantinople and 
on the other La Prose de Constantinople, as well as the third, 1969 
(Les lieux-dits) which is accompanied by a subtitle "little guide to 
traveling through the book." 
Yet the attempt to include, through roundabout ways, that which, 
in order to complete itself with apparent candor, fiction represses, led 
me also to observe that which, in order to complete itself with similar 
conspicuous innocence, reflection on fiction represses. For, among 
the different procedures in fiction capable of bringing to light the &Tit 
that permits it, one must consider the passages that could reflect them- 
selves to the point of taking up the &Tit as a theme in a certain way. 
However, except for introducing them in my novels in the form of pure 
reflexive sequences that would have bluntly analyzed such active 
mechanisms on the page, it was necessary to blend these passages as 
much as possible in the ensemble, in short to inflict upon them the very 
rules that invested fiction obeyed. It is this effort to subject similar 
reflections on the ecrit to these particular rules which made me 
realize, word by word, in an eminently practical manner, at what point 
my articles, elsewhere, on various ecrits, constantly eluded all con- 
tamination by their object in order to establish themselves. Ques- 
tioning a first sanctuary (the sanctuary of the fictional &Tit preserved 
from reflection on itself) surreptitiously led me to challenge a second 2




one (the sanctuary of the ecrit reflecting on fiction while protecting 
itself from its mechanisms). 
Even if this criss-crossing of fiction and its reflection never com- 
pleted itself for me without the receding of a certain overall picture, 
even if I think I may say today that they form the jolts tied to what I 
could call a new understanding of the "text," still I would not know 
how to overlook the role of practical experimentation in this type of 
boomerang effect. 
Consequently Le Theatre des metamorphoses is less an explora- 
tion of the practical consequences of Barthes' judgement than an 
experiment risked within the internal process of a somewhat reflected 
work. 
2. With the 1982 publication ofLe Th6atre des metamorphoses 
we could say that its "mixed" mode ofexposition was the result ofthe 
coincidence of a double interactive practice, one implied in the 
writing of fictional works, the other in the theory of the artistic text. 
Said differently, isn't this mixity (of discursive regimes, registers of 
language, intertexts, representative supports) also the outcome, at 
the time, of your double activity as novelist and theoretician of the 
Nouveau Roman? 
What I have just called "a certain overall picture," is, among 
other things, the "materialist" concern (if one wishes to understand 
this word not in a common sense but in its philosophical usage) with 
shielding my work, at least from the too much established specializa- 
tions of today, and, notably the one which separates a practice from its 
theory. Similarly for "literature," a term I use in order to go more 
quickly. Doubtless some literary hacks have enjoyed reflecting with 
care on literary mechanisms through writing. Doubtless some 
professors have risked creating works by themselves. Yet they consti- 
tute, these and others, but a tiny minority. Generally we are not sur- 
prised that literature is made by persons who seemingly do not find it 
too useful to reflect about it profoundly in the open, nor that reflection 
on literature be carried out by people who apparently do not consider 
it a point of honor to produce it. My work, I admit, goes firmly against 
this division, more accepted than thought out, and this may be seen, 
notably, in the alternation of my novels with my theoretical works. 
Thus my double effort as novelist and theoretician of the Nouveau 3
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Roman seems to me to have been the crucible of this encounter of fic- 
tion and its reflection, finally, on the very same pages. Insofar as they 
were already accomplished by the same operator, they found them- 
selves, how could I say, psychologically and technically less foreign to 
each other. 
3. Once having established a structured tie, then having com- 
pleted the complementary stimulus between the writing offiction and 
its theoretical reflection in order to make them blend yet contest each 
other in the same work, why didn't you pursue this avenue (that of 
intratextual transtheory and transfiction)? Does the conceptual 
opposition between "theory" and "fiction" seem less pertinent to 
you today? Is it replaced by the opposition between "script" and 
"text"? How did you arrive at these distinctions, currently found at 
the beginning of the Elements de textique, between "script" and 
"text," "scripture" and "texture," "representation" and "meta- 
representation"? 
Revelations minuscules, en guise de preface, a la gloire de Jean 
Paulhan, those one hundred pages or so added to the beginning of 
Revolutions minuscules in 1988 for a new edition is not so far in many 
respects from certain experiences of which you speak. But although I 
have not renounced this project, it is true that I have limited my work 
in this direction. I perceive two reasons for this. 
One is external, if you wish. The singular animosity or the 
curious silence that critics showed regarding Le Thedtre des 
metamorphoses confirmed my hypotheses, that, for the moment, an 
effort to mould these regions is liable to anathema. Assuming the 
situation might one day be less so in this regard, I consider it is 
presently a little too obtuse. 
The other is internal. The relationship between my fiction and 
my theoretical works obeys a sort of alternation. First an experi- 
mental volume, then a phase of reflection that attempts to grasp its 
implications and consequences, even if, for reasons I will not stop to 
consider here, other books besides my own shall eventually be 
solicited. La Prise de Constantinople, in 1965, then Le Thedtre des 
metamorphoses, in 1982, formed the two main experiences which 
each opened up a long theoretical period for me. It is in the phase thus 
allowed by Le Thedtre des metamorphoses that I came to anticipate 
the possibility of this perhaps new discipline: Textics. 4




In particular Textics observes that fiction and theory, even 
though they might poorly accept their reciprocal contamination, are 
nevertheless, in a certain light, ecrits of the same nature. According to 
its constitutive postulate, in effect, ecrits can only accommodate two 
sorts of fruitful structures. On one hand, those which contribute to an 
effect of representation, that is, to quote an accepted definition, call 
"forth to the mind through the means of language" [langage] (we call 
scriptures those structures capable of an effect of representation, and 
script ecrit that actually bears them). On another level, those which 
exceed this effect of representation and participate in an effect of 
meta-representation, that is, let transpire that which representation 
tends to obliterate within its mechanism (we then name textures those 
structures that bring about meta-representation and text the ecrit 
when it respects this order). Insofar as ecrits of fiction and theory 
essentially obey the pure representative regime, they are-beyond 
their differences-both scripts. However close they might be, fiction 
and theory do not present identical resistance, of course, to a possible 
meta-representative process. Inasmuch as fiction accepts a clear 
"imaginary" dimension, briefly let us say, allows a certain lack of 
being for what it represents, it poses less of an obstacle to an activity 
that exceeds representativeness itself Insofar as theory, except for 
declaring itself fictive, claims the greatest accuracy possible con- 
cerning reality, if you wish, it could only offer active resistance to the 
operations that exceed its effort at representation. 
If prolonging my brief deliberations in too simple a mode may be 
tolerated, I will retrospectively observe that in the background of La 
Prise de Constantinople, what always interested me in the Nouveau 
Roman volumes, perhaps somewhat gropingly, were meta- 
representative procedures. Consequently, to take up the passage from 
this novel to Le The des metamorphoses succinctly but more 
technically, we can say that in the first, it is fiction, less restive, that 
undergoes meta-representation with its extreme rules and the inten- 
sification of a certain self-reflexivity, and that in the second, it is 
particularly theory, although more resistant, that receives in turn 
those two sorts of treatment. In short, the contamination of theory by 
fiction in this book is not a simple fictionalization of theory, which 
would become purely "imaginary," but rather a relativization, as 
calculated as possible, of that which theory asserts through the impact 
of meta-representative structures developed, so far, more easily 
within fiction. 5
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4. With this new concept of "meta-representation" the concern 
is clearly no longer to challenge but to surpass representation. Is this 
a radical change of strategy? 
Rather than a change of strategy, I prefer to speak of a broader 
perspective. To persist, as I have too much, in "challenging repre- 
sentation" could allow one to believe that it was useful to undermine 
representation because it was intrinsically ill-fated. What Textics 
assumes from now on, to get to the point, are the following three posi- 
tions: on the one hand, representation is a primordial activity and 
there is no interest in directly attacking it in itself; on the other, repre- 
sentation constituently makes one see only at the price of an eventual 
censure of that which allows it to take place. Finally, the patient 
bringing to light of what is thereby obfuscated should make it possible 
technically and intelligibly to reduce fallacious innocence, its way of 
showing and, as a result, what it shows, by making perceptible word 
by word and conceptually the hidden reasons that institute it. 
5. I presume that it is because Le Thdatre des metamorphoses 
pushes mew-representative work very far that it is, as you have told 
me elsewhere, "untranslatable." Would you care to clarify your 
remarks concerning this question? 
Yes, it is certainly the incessant meta-representative concern that 
renders this work "untranslatable." In effect, among the various 
procedures capable of calling forth, in a fiction for example, the ecrit 
that permits it, one must not only consider, as I said earlier, passages 
that would in some way take up the ecrit as a theme (which form those 
particular textures that Textics calls catoptrotextures) but also the 
bringing into play of added regulations (these in fact constitute all 
other textures) through which the ecrit directly displays itself, one 
could say. However, in order to answer you with care, I would hope to 
proceed first with a schematic reminder of more or less accepted 
functionings. 
If one calls translation, quite simply, the manoeuver that substi- 
tutes a given formulation, a certain identical other, or for lack of better 
term, a similar one on the level of meaning, then it is clear that this 
operation is indispensable (within an idiom), useful (between several 
languages) and . . . dangerous (in both cases). 
Translation is indispensable within a language because it per- 6




forms a constitutive function: without it, meaning could never come 
about. From this angle, meaning is virtual in a well-formed oral or 
written statement. It only becomes actual upon being heard or read. 
This permanent deciphering, even if its mechanism for the person who 
performs it is largely unconscious, merely stems from an intra- 
linguistic translation. On the level of meaning, one only understands 
what one is able to formulate in a different way. 
Translation is only useful when it occurs from one language to 
another, because it plays a propagating role. Meaning is constituted 
with an oral or written statement well-formed and well deciphered in a 
certain language. It is divulged, simply, by its transfer into a different 
language. To be less expeditious, we can say that the passage of 
meaning from one language to another supposes a minimum of three 
related translations: the possibility of intralinguistic translation in the 
original language, without which the formula to be translated would 
not have attained meaning (phase of constitution); the accomplish- 
ment of an interlinguistic translation that ensures the transfer of one 
idiom to another (phase of propagation); the possibility of an intra- 
linguistic translation in the target language, without which the 
meaning of the translated formulation would not be achieved (phase of 
reconstitution). 
Since it is indispensable to the constitution of meaning (in a lan- 
guage) and useful to its propagation (among several), translation 
should not be refuted. But one would have to be naively dazzled by its 
considerable advantages to overlook its true drawbacks. In effect, if 
the constitution of meaning presumes at least two ingredients (the 
formula that virtualizes and the deciphering that actualizes it), then, in 
principle, translation, whether it be within one language or in between 
two, and since it always supposes, reversibly, the replacement of the 
emitted formula, inflicts on meaning, by making it seem autonomous, 
the effacement of the material bases of its coming about. 
Yet this magic, in short, representative innocence, causes two 
very serious related faults with regard to meaning: one, impoverish- 
ment, is understood easily enough; the other, the restoration of 
innocence ("l'innocentement"), is generally less accepted. 
There is always impoverishment of meaning because with the 
withdrawal of the initial formula, translation in its effect dissolves the 
added semanticism that material specificity had inferred. The 
assumption that the meaning of a formula usually goes beyond, often 
more than a little, that which is brought about by the simple exchange 7
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with a different homosemic formula is indeed emphasized, however 
simply, by the classic division of the denoted and connoted (this, we 
insist if necessary, exceeds the particular instance successively blown 
out of proportion by Hjelmslev and Barthes). 
Thus, to write with Baudelaire: 
Mon enfant, ma soeur, 
Songe a la douceur 
D'aller ld-bas vivre ensemble. . . . 
amounts to overstepping the meaning we obtain, either within a lan- 
guage and possibly from one language to another, by a homosemic 
exchange of words. We remark that the rhyme which according to 
Textics belongs to the category of isochorotextures (meta- 
representative structures by the allocation of elements specially tied 
to identical places), produces, in this case, its own supplementary 
effect on the register of meaning. Let us observe this more closely with 
other technical notions of autochorotextures (meta-representative 
structures by allocation of lexical elements in superposition) and of 
metacratylism (calculated semantic fruit which ensues from this con- 
structed superposition). Here the lexical superposition obviously 
derives from the analytical virtue of the rhyme or, if one prefers a more 
technical enunciation, the isochorotexture in that it focuses on a 
semantized element, provokes an autochorotexture. On one level, 
because of isophonism (identical sound in both words), and because 
of isochorism (identical place of respective words in the two verses), 
the rhyme finds itself promoting, notably, the second syllable of the 
word "douceur," or, if we prefer, it cuts the word in two segments 
"dou-ceur." On another level, and because "ceur" was underlined 
only insofar as we again hear "soeur," the rhyme brings the word 
"douceur" to import, we could say, the word "soeur" which pro- 
duced its analysis. In short, when it mobilizes a semantized particle, 
the rhyme fabricates partial portmanteau words in filigree. Here: 
"dou-soeur." Consequently, with such an arrangement, and whether 
this delights or distresses, the semanticism of "douceur" finds itself 
fraught with an insidious . . . sorority in this exclusive passage. It is 
here a matter of a metacratylism in that the extraordinarily calcu- 
lated or, if one prefers, poetic etymology-the one we could explicate 
by daring to affirm that if we do believe these lines, the word "soeur" 
is at the origin of the word "douceur"-totally surpasses, which is not 8




without bearing, the principle of the much-doubted cratylian 
etymology. Fully occupied ideologically with trying to obtain an 
affinity between words and things, cratylism likes to see, often to the 
point of abuse, primary words within others, alleged bearers in the last 
resort, of their deepest meaning. Entirely dedicated structurally to 
making the materiality of words prominent, the machine of rhymes for 
example, traps with its mechanism-that makes it function in a con- 
spicuous and regulated manner-the too unknown tendency of the 
mind to magically link two ideas on the basis of "their" words. 
By dissolving the initial formula, meaning is also made innocent 
because the effect of translation eliminates the material arrangement 
responsible, at least in part, for the substance itself of discourse. Even 
if it seems a bit forced, it is perhaps useful, in matters of writing [ "dcri- 
ture"] to dramatically oppose two unequal points of view: the 
common opinion (that of Bceotians who are not attentive to these 
problems) and the technical judgement (that of writers when they 
think about what they are doing). According to common opinion 
writing is simply obtaining certain arrangements of words based upon 
a certain meaning. According to technical judgement writing is also 
obtaining meaning based on certain arrangements of words. And this 
concern, which gives an actual role to consonances, among others in 
the issuing of meaning, appears with two contrary perspectives: not 
only that which is apparent, with their regulated research, but also 
what is less visible, with their methodical refusal. 
When Baudelaire, in order to achieve rhyme, places the two 
words "douceur" and "soeur" in certain calculated parts of the ecrit, 
not only does he provoke the supplementary issue of the semantic 
effects sketched earlier, but he also makes one grasp that, far from 
being a pure innocent assertion, what he enunciates has been 
obliquely governed by the materiality required to say it. In effect, let 
us first suppose, with perhaps a grain of salt, that the poet previously 
wrote: 
Mon enfant, ma mie, 
Songe a la douceur 
D'aller la-bas vivre ensemble. . . . 
Let us suppose that he then realized that the rhyme fell short. Let us 
suppose that finally, to obtain the desirable prescribed consonances, 
he consented to one of these transformations: 9
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Mon enfant, ma soeur, 
Songe a la douceur 
D'aller lii-bas vivre ensemble. . . . 
Mon enfant, ma mie, 
Songe a l'alchimie 
D'aller la-bas vivre ensemble. . . . 
There is no difficulty in seeing that with each of these solutions, he 
would have accepted a semantic displacement: in the first case, from a 
harmless tenderness to an incestuous affection; in the second, from a 
sensitive well-being to a profound metamorphosis. Or, if one prefers, 
the concern with obtaining regulated consonances is not insignificant 
in the meaning that results. 
And the same phenomenon is found, no less, with the systematic 
refusal of the proximate return of the same sounds. When Flaubert, in 
a letter on his work as a writer, shows himself "discovering in all sen- 
tences words to be changed, consonances to be removed," he does not 
fail to make known that he proceeds to the final choice of words on the 
basis of their sounds-after the fashion of the poet, and even if, 
reversely. Let us once more suppose, to preserve the example, that 
Flaubert first wrote the beginning of Baudelaire's poem. Let us then 
suppose that he observed the consonance of "soeur" and "douceur," 
and that he later realized that in this manner he failed to repeat his 
proscriptive writing rule. Let us finally suppose that in order to abolish 
the repetition, he accepted, according to the substitutive interplay of 
approximate synonyms, one of these changes: "Mon enfant, ma 
soeur, songe au bien-etre," "Mon enfant, ma mie, songe a la 
douceur. . . ." No difficulty, of course in comprehending that with 
each of these solutions, he would have consented to a semantic shift: 
from the sensitive "douceur" to the more abstract "well-being", from 
the incestuous "ma soeur" to the harmless "ma mie." Or, if we prefer, 
the concern with abolishing the consonances discovered is not insig- 
nificant either in the meaning that arises. 
These examples, one will object, are too schematic and 
imaginary to contain probing force. Yet this is far from certain. In 
truth, except for the naivete of believing that ecrits, for many writers, 
appear out of the blue, beyond reproach beneath the flow of the foun- 
tain pen, who could ever conceive poem or prose writers working 
more or less in another way? Therefore by severing meaning from the 10




material conditions of its issue, translation ineluctably obliterates 
various dominant aspects of the intelligibility of the ecrit. 
One can say that this cruel fundamental situation is subjected to 
two contrary agents. On one hand, the informed translator [trans- 
lateur] who attempts to translate what is problematic tries as much as 
possible to restore, despite everything, that which the inevitable 
change of formulas statutorily dissolves in the target language, sup- 
posing that he perceives it. On the other hand, the informed writer who 
ends up problematizing translation mobilizes to the highest point the 
material resources of its formulas through his specific work (and all 
the more clearly if it is meta-representative). Actually in the case of 
meta-representation it is easy to understand that the special supple- 
mentary regulations (the textures, I recall, according to Textics) form 
two unequal ensembles: some of them, of course, because of their 
peculiar nature (those, notably, that play on the numbers of elements 
mobilized), can be, to a certain extent, transposed in another lan- 
guage, but many others are refractory, which prevents the transfer of 
the overall structure in which they are involved. Insofar as the process 
that shaped it pushes far, very far, the meta-representative concern, 
Le Theatre des metamorphoses therefore seems to me, superlatively, 
an "untranslatable" work. 
That is not to say, however, that its translation, at least in part, 
may not be attempted. In my view it is possible, but by making promi- 
nent one of the translator's efforts which remains too unknown: like a 
reading machine. In effect, to become aware of translating the 
problematic with an ecru that, in itself, systematically problematizes 
translation, to me, could hardly be imagined except in the resolute 
course of a translation itself problematic: an activity which would 
assume the task of seeking ways out only to find dead ends, the struc- 
tures in certain places which would rebel against transfer. Conse- 
quently, what, at best, takes refuge at times in minimal intrapaginal 
remarks with the title Notes by the Ranslator, would open up into a 
minute critical discourse as much on the pages to be translated as on 
the gesture attempted for their translation, and would contribute 
through this precise device to a theory of the text. 
6. Doesn't the fact that this meta-representative concern defines 
most of your fictional texts explain that in the United States your 
theoretical work is better known than your novels or short stories? 11
Ricardou: Interview: "How to Reduce Fallacious Representative Innocence, Wo
Published by New Prairie Press
288 STCL, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer, 1991) 
Insofar as a writer systematically works the structures of meta- 
representation, and this is truly my principal effort in my novels and 
short stories, then undoubtedly they make that which some would call 
a sacrifice: that, to a very high point, of restricting the pertinence of 
one's work to the only language in which it took place. A sacrifice? 
This is far from certain for, as soon as it is understood, the game is per- 
haps worth the play. In effect, how much do the benefits of a reader- 
ship possibly increased to the global scale, with the agreeable transfer 
of a book in several languages (all this comes under, how to put it, the 
economic, the sociological, the psychological for the writer) weigh 
when compared to the unappreciable intellectual gains that one can 
reap only through a certain "untranslatable" way of writing (they per- 
tain to intellection of unknown functionings of thought)? 
And to say a little more concerning this field, I consider, accord- 
ing to what texticians call a scalar appraisal, that one must know how 
to trace a line between two sorts of universality. A low universality: 
that of translation, which can only distribute a meta-representative 
work on a large scale by eliminating, in principle, some of its essential 
traits. A high universality: that of the untranslatable, which makes 
conceivable, not translation, but what must be called an inter- 
linguistic correlation: the bringing to light (should it happen to be 
more or less emphasized) or writing (should it occur that the work be 
more or less flawed) in the target language of a completely different 
work, at first sight, and close in depth because it obeys identical prin- 
ciples. In short, the restriction of a work to its own language, far from 
producing an enclosure, is what in relation to another language, makes 
possible a less naive communication, not that of such and such a 
meaning, but that of the machine that produces meanings. 
7. The preamble of Le Theatre des metamorphoses, "Apprecia- 
tion," shatply attacks the functioning of the press often with humor 
and sometimes with sarcasm. At the same time it dismantles its 
effects on our reading practices. This political and polemical dimen- 
sion of the book is noteworthy. Your reader who is often led to 
develop plays on the signifiers in the wake of the text could see in this 
counter model a way of opposing that which the "press "favors: for 
example, "press" and "haste" in reading, "compression" or 
"stereotypical reduction of reality" (p. 23), "pressure" on our ways 
of thinking ("the regulation of readings," p. 14); therefore doesn't 12




Le ThCatre des metamorphoses function as a sort of "anti-press 
machine"? 
Yes, one can say Le Theatre des metamorphoses is a sort of 
"anti-press machine," but at the price of an initial precaution: that 
which distinguishes the two words which the utterance "the press" 
superimposes, at least in French. "The press"? This means haste. 
"The press"? This means the newspapers. Certainly on one hand, Le 
Theatre des metamorphoses is an "anti-haste machine." To be brief, 
all readers who read rapidly are unconscious illiterates. On the other, 
no less, Le Theatre des metamorphoses is an "anti-newspaper 
machine." Doubtless the two machines are related: "press" func- 
tions to "press" or, if one prefers, newspapers function to hasten. But 
to speak of haste is to aim at a functioning of representation and to 
speak of newspapers is to touch upon a site of representation. Allow 
me to pursue this last point. 
Yes, we can say Le Theatre des metamorphoses is an "anti- 
newspaper machine," but at the price of a new precaution: the one 
stipulating that the offensive which in effect may be found, far from 
responding to an objective (the book does not progress in order to 
question the press), comes about, which is slightly different, as a con- 
sequence (the book, as it progresses, finds itself contesting the 
press). 
This phenomenon springs from dissymmetry: that which charac- 
terizes the clash of representation with meta-representation. Repre- 
sentation, as a system of thought, refuses meta-representation 
because representation fears it (tending in practice to defend itself 
against the return of what it obliterates in order to come about). Meta- 
representation, as a system of thought, considers representation, 
because it surpasses representation (tending in practice to question, to 
take place, that which representation obliterates). As a result, meta- 
representative activity contemplates representative manoeuvers from 
above and it is from below that the manoeuvers of representation per- 
ceive meta-representative activity. 
Meta-representative activity contemplates it from above? 
Practically concerned with obtaining mechanisms capable of 
disclosing that which representation dissolves and theoretically 
curious to understand the relevant procedures, as it progresses, meta- 
representative activity encounters representation in that it produces a 13
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negative censorship. Subsequently, meta-representative activity is 
capable of exposing to what point the representative exercise com- 
mits, as much as it can, a double nullification: on one hand, the 
obliteration of all material means through which it represents; on the 
other, the eviction of all objects, or of all that which, in an object, 
resists representation. Yet, what characterizes the "press" could well 
be, on one hand, its hegemonic function according to representation 
("universal reportage," I believe, Stephane Mallarme said) and, on 
the other, today, its growing ascendancy ("journalism, outcome of 
philosophy," I think Michel Foucault said). As a result, because it 
keeps losing all sense of proportion through arrogant expansionism, 
from the angle of its object, one can understand the double stereotype 
it inflicts on reality. On one level, a conformity of selection (which 
causes it to choose and promote what is representable) and, on 
another, a conformity of behavior (which brings some people, 
willingly, under such power, to conform in order to be confirmed, to 
become representable). 
Representative manoeuvers perceive from below? To be brief, 
here is what a funny example reveals: the slight misfortune which 
befell the newspaper Le Monde's serial writer, Bertrand Poirot- 
Delpech, on the occasion of his harsh attack, of course, on Le Theritre 
des metamorphoses. Wanting to show that I wrote badly, he quoted 
four sentences from this book and, consciously or not, one doesn't 
know which is worse, he tampered with three of them. Must one add 
that among these sentences may be found precisely the one that 
evokes the . . . "stereotypical reduction, of reality?" 
8. What you described earlier as the "internal process of a 
somewhat reflected work" led you towards writing workshops, as 
you yourself recall at the end of "Les raisons de rensemble," the 
complementary study you recently added to the new edition (revised 
and completed for Seuils, -Points" collection) of your best known 
work (Le Nouveau Roman, p. 248). In the United States writing 
workshops have for a long time been semi-institutionalized within 
the university while in France, where they are just beginning to be 
recognized, you today appear as one of their most fervent precursors. 
Marianne Alphant in a recent survey ("Le mal des mots," Lib6ra- 
tion, 19 April 1990, p. 24) recalled your work as a pioneer in this 
field, notably in Paris at the College International de Philosophie 
and in certain symposia on text didactics at Cerisy-la-Salle. Today 14




how could you situate your conception of workshops in relation to 
other parallel currents? 
In effect, it has certainly been an internal necessity for various 
aspects of my work which has led me towards the principle of writing 
workshops. I would rather not specify the ensemble of these opera- 
tional obligations (deriving from the constructive principles of my 
work), but I would like to clarify at least two. 
One could be called the necessary collectivity In the study you 
mention, "Les raisons de l'ensemble," I tried to make clear how a 
writer becomes sensitive to the collective once he accepts himself as a 
scriptor instead of an author. However in this case the collective 
presents two modes of integration. Gentle integration, tied to 
grouping (one admits that one's personal work can be referred not to 
the standards of the person that supplied it, but rather, compared to 
the work of several others), and this is the reason I participated in the 
Nouveau Roman. Strong integration, tied to cooperation (one 
accepts that one's personal contribution finds itself articulated with 
the work of others) and this explains my recourse to writing 
workshops. 
The other obligation could be titled the fundamental triad. 
According to my views an activity can not be integrally completed 
from the operational angle unless it is connected with a practice, a 
theory, didactics. It is not possible for me here to emphasize either the 
deployed triad, laying out the relations of each of its sub-activities to 
the others (how each helps the other and benefits from it) or 
redeployed triad arranging the insertions of each with the others (how 
each one is an intrinsic part of the other). However, since we are 
dealing with writing I can briefly make clear some rudimentary 
aspects of the deployed triad beginning with one of its three foci, that 
of didactics. 
The didactics of writing supposes that the organizer possesses an 
effective practice of the act of writing. In fact, it is such a practice that 
allows her to say, with full knowledge of the practice: "here is how we 
must proceed." In short, the practice of the organizer gives force to the 
example in collectivity. Let us say that practice contributes psycho- 
logical supports (the partners are less unwilling towards someone 
who has already proved her capacity with her works, or can put them 
right away to the test) and a technical assistance (when an example is 
taken not from another writer but from her own resources, or from her 15
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own immediate improvisation, one presents it knowing whether or not 
the case is easy). 
The didactics of writing presumes no less that the organizer has 
an explicit theory of the act of writing. In effect, this theory plays at 
least a double role. On one level, if its firmness and clearness are suffi- 
cient, this theory permits the organizer to say with all the required pre- 
cision: "here is what must be done." In short, an explicit theory 
improves communication in collectivity. It brings a coherence and a 
rigor in specifying the work perspective, in the stipulation of the target 
structures, in the clarification of what must be accomplished. On 
another level, if its abstraction and elaboration are sufficient they 
guarantee that the organizer is less likely to surreptitiously impose, in 
total opposition of collective work, certain tastes that could be his 
own. Without an assiduous practice and elaborated theory of what we 
propose, we risk falling into the vague: inviting others to do what cor- 
responds to one's own simple preferences, and which we perhaps do 
not know how to do very well, perhaps without being very capable of 
successfully inviting to perform. . . . 
Without of course wishing to prejudge activities that are realized 
under the sign of writing workshops, the functioning that I advocate 
would induce me probably to ask straightaway, from the organizers' 
point of view, at least one of these two questions. To the literary hack, 
let us say, supposing that his writing appeared effective to me, "Where 
is your theory?" To the professor, let us say, assuming that he disposes 
of a theory: "Where is your practice?" I wonder if these two ques- 
tions are not enough to define, without doubt in the company of a few 
others, a rather exclusive place. . . . 
One last word. Although it seems improbable that I deserve 
them, to suppose the titles "precursor" and "pioneer" poses the risk 
of a double edge. 
They can be useful if one considers them within the perspective 
of intellection. Not having been the last to grasp a certain thing means 
to find oneself with a title, in effect of the precise configuration of 
thought which made such an understanding possible. Thus for me, it is 
the fundamental correlating triad, practice, theory, didactics, always 
active in my reflection, that has allowed me, not only, the visible por- 
tion of the iceberg, if one may say so, to give, for example, in the 
middle of the eighties a seminar on writing workshops at the Coll6ge 
International de Philosophie in Paris, but also, earlier in the sixties 
and seventies, to give an increasingly experimental form to my 16




teaching of writing at the high school level. In effect, the two ques- 
tions that I always feel like asking others, I had of course asked myself 
first. In short: "You who claim to be a teacher of writing, how does 
your teaching imply your theory of the text, your practice as writer?" 
Consequently, with the utmost prudence, for unless one has an exces- 
sive tendency towards irresponsibility, students should never be con- 
sidered mere guinea pigs, my teaching has incessantly evolved. I gave 
a minimal idea of this in my article "Ecrire en classe," published in 
1978 in the pedagogical review Pratiques. Allow me simply to 
emphasize two aspects. On one level, concerning the structures of the 
ecrit, the increasing bringing into play of parallelisms (notably since 
they allow a mechanism to be considered according to a plurality of 
integrated examples) and the concern with the articulation of the 
characteristic work of various students (each "essay" being personal 
at the base but capable of relating to the ensemble). On another, con- 
cerning the structure of teaching, the increasing integration of various 
disciplines, regarding language (grammar, vocabulary) and, to a cer- 
tain extent, the rest (the other forms of knowledge) in the production 
of the ecrit itself. 
But the titles of "precursor" and "pioneer" could be misleading, 
no less in this case, for they could encourage two misunderstandings. 
One could come from the possible surreptitious shifting from one 
perspective to another: from intellection (having at last succeeded in 
understanding a certain thing) to competition (being one of the first to 
have succeeded). This could risk drawing more attention to the per- 
formance aspect of the novelty than to the instructive reasons which 
allowed it to take place in someone. The other, more serious, would lie 
in the creation of an artificial homogeneousness: the "pioneer" being 
s/he who cleared the way. To concede this role to such a person tends 
to imply the idea that s/he was eventually followed, in short that those 
who supposedly came behind accomplished similar tasks since they 
took the same route. If it is certainly not prohibited for anyone to 
exhibit the sign of the writing workshop, one should be careful to avoid 
all notions that could lead us to believe, on the whole, in an identical 
activity everywhere. "Precursor-ship" encourages this danger. 
9. For you "writing" actually means "rewriting." "Workshop 
writing" implies more a sort of "trans-subjective" writing, that is, 
collective and interactive writing where each one in turn assumes the 
role of reader and writer of the other. In an important article on the 17
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topic ("Pour une theorie de la rdcriture," Podtique 77, 1989) you 
conclude with the following eloquent formula, "Be what in writing 
you become." Would you care to comment? 
Assuming that writing is always more or less rewriting, we can, if 
we wish to go quickly, make this evident with a sort of paradox. How 
do most people operate with their missive? They write with the flow of 
the fountain pen, at best reread themselves without crossing out 
hardly anything and, even, simply avoid rereading. In short, and since 
they do not see any reason for perfecting their first version, they sup- 
pose, they who do not claim to be writers, that in fact they know how to 
write. . . . Inversely, those who call themselves writers, recognize 
themselves notably-oh profusion of drafts!-by the proliferation of 
their erasures. In short, and since they incessantly labor to improve 
their ecrit, they in fact suppose that they scarcely know how to 
write. . . . But of course, the paradox is merely apparent: against the 
difficulty of writing, the gesture of crossing out betrays not a lack, but 
rather a knowledge: that of improving. Consequently, and except for 
inverting the roles, one must agree: the writer is s/he who crosses out, 
briefly rewrites because s/he has the aptitude. The others are those 
who exempt themselves because they are lacking in this respect. 
If then writing specifically is supplying, not a first draft (since 
everyone is free to do so as long as he is not orthographically 
impaired), but rather through an interplay of erasures, an ensemble of 
improvements (since this, precisely is how the writer distinguishes 
from others), then to write, even though it might surprise, is to 
incessantly become someone else. Confronting his first version, he 
who leaves it as such assures that he has remained the same; he who 
transforms it thus attests that he has become different. He is the 
person who no longer accepts what he accepted before from his ecrit. 
Yet this metamorphosis, made apparent by the erasure, has taken 
place slightly before. He who continuously leaves his ecrit untouched 
is the one who, going over it, again finds what he meant to say (this 
what Textics calls recouverte). The person who resolutely transforms 
his ecrit is the one, who, looking at it, perceives, at least in part that 
which he actually inscribed, (this is what deserves to be called, 
properly, rereading). The writer is he who, rereading himself with 
another eye, sufficiently avoids the hallucination of "something to 
say" in order to see "something written." The writer is therefore, not 18




he who, persevering in his being, expresses himself, but he who, 
crossing out, has transformed himself in his act. 
Consequently I can answer two aspects of your question. 
It is because a writer always proceeds as two (she who inscribes 
and she who making herself rather different knows how to reread her- 
self) that it is possible to write as several. It is because writing always 
mobilizes another internal self that it can be accomplished in prin- 
ciple with another external self. But this is possible only on the condi- 
tion that otherness truly takes place. This is what makes operational 
reversibility possible in a workshop: external otherness can be some- 
one else's otherness only if she equally bears within herself another 
self whose otherness is the relay for the other. Briefly one must 
prevent subjectivity (maintaining a "self") from finding itself 
replaced by neo-subjectivity (the domination by one exterior "self" of 
the other) or through inter-subjectivity (the mutual transactions of the 
respective "selves" which leaves each one the same) and to attain a 
trans-subjectivity, as you put it well (the reciprocal attenuation of 
respective "selves"). What makes possible such a rapport is, of 
course, the presence in a workshop of a theory which is effective in the 
detachment of its abstraction and the precision of its concepts. 
It is because a writer, perhaps in spite of himself, only operates 
while he continues accepting the activity of the other within himself- 
which is not without bearing-that I took the liberty of inverting the 
famous Nietzschean formula as an exhortation "Become who you 
are," which stresses the potentiality of being into "Be what in writing 
you become," which invites one to accept one's operational 
metamorphosis. 
10. Among your latest fictional texts, two in particular are not 
only delightful but also remarkable in that, pursuing the Theatre 
experience, they inaugurate a new ricardolian "revolution." The 
rhythm, play with tenses, breaks, interpolated clauses, in short, how 
could I say, the manner, the spiraling art of "phrasing" today draw 
my attention with Revelations minuscules, en guise de preface, a la 
gloire de Jean Paulhan and the first short story from La cathedrale de 
Sens, Le lapsus circulaire. Would you care to say a few words about 
these texts? 
For thirty years now I have intensified my assiduous efforts on 19
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the page and at the same time attempted to obtain a coherent and 
minute theory of ecriture. Therefore, it is not impossible after such 
labor that I ended up succeeding, notably with these two texts, indeed 
the most recent, in various tiny things. Moreover it would be difficult 
for me to give an idea of them in a few words. To put it simply, I will 
merely oppose these two texts to my 1982 volume. Le Theatre des 
metamorphoses clearly displays an experimental status: it is on an 
immediately spectacular mode that it mobilizes one graphic and 
typographic diversity, as well as abundant structures established in 
excess. Thus, it happens that parallelisms overly develop in long 
series according to links and accumulations that border on frenzy. On 
the other hand, Le lapsus circulaire and Revelations minuscules, en 
guise de preface, a la gloire de Jean Paulhan on the whole obey a 
greater reserve. It does not mean that correlative oddities are fewer 
but, apart from crises here and there of elucidation, they tend to blend 
in a flow more smoothly although still pirouetting. I would prefer in 
this respect to speak of an underhanded classicism through which 
many traditional resources of harmonious prose, to borrow here the 
language of the Academy, are caught in structural interplays which 
surreptitiously overstep them. 
What distinguishes Le Lapsus circulaire and Revelations 
minuscules, en guise de preface, a la gloire de Jean Paulhan from the 
rnixt Le Theatre des metamorphoses is not a strategical divergence: it 
is still a question of dismantling fallacious representative innocence 
through the virtues of meta-representation. Rather it is a tactical dif- 
ference: the point is to restrict ostentatious permanent structural 
aggressivity in order to subtract the conspicuous support that it might 
give the reader and to diminish in this way the new intellectual com- 
fort, to the second power in a certain sense, which as a result could 
settle into place. 
11. I gathered, in the course of your last seminar on Textics at 
Cerisy, that this discipline, according to you, aspired not only to 
explain theoretically different structures of the ecrit, but that it 
involved a sort of combat, even a philosophical or ideological "mis- 
sion." Could you clarify this stance? 
In its nascent elaboration, Textics encounters the three main con- 
cerns of all attempts at knowledge: the delimitation of its field, the effi- 
ciency of its analyses and the coherence of its concepts. 20




The delimitation of its field? From the beginning, Textics 
restrained its domain to the ecrit (understood as an ensemble of marks 
associated with a language flanguel and left on a support by means of 
an adequate instrument), inasmuch as it can bear scriptures (struc- 
tures whose effect is to represent) or textures (structures whose effect 
is to meta-represent). Textics may be therefore divided into two 
branches: Scriptics, which studies scriptures, and Textics proper, 
which studies textures. 
The efficiency of its analyses? As it progresses, Textics applies 
itself to multiplying a large variety of examples-either of already 
admitted arrangements or of others that are less so and up to details at 
times minute-on which it tests the operational fecundity of its views; 
in short, it puts itself to the test through the field it has defined. 
The coherence of its concepts? Its postulate, according to which 
the ecrit can only be representative (that is, evidently with possible 
flaws in this register, taco -representative), or meta-representative 
(that is, of course, with its possible faults from this angle, cacometa- 
representative), seems to establish, at least for now, as it develops, an 
intellectual apparatus capable ofarticulately conceiving all the struc- 
tures of the ecrit in their relationships. 
Thus Textics is at once closed (through the restraints of the 
specificities of its field), and open (because of the nature of its postu- 
late). It operates around a specific scope and supposes an expansion. 
In effect, the ecrit as we know is not the only means that allows repre- 
sentation. Therefore, through a first enlargement, and on the condi- 
tion, of course, that one changes what must accordingly be changed, 
nothing prevents testing its postulate and methods through other 
fields. Eventually Textics' vocation is to expand into pantextics, 
general Textics including sectorial Textics: scriptotextics (applied to 
the ecrit), iconotextics (applied to the image). 
However expandable it may be, representation could very well 
present a part-misleading for the whole-of the intrinsic mech- 
anisms of structural obfuscation. Likewise, an entity could very 
well-because it subordinates them like components-always 
weaken, more or less, the various elements that it involves. As a 
result, according to a second enlargement, pantextics would seek to 
expand into metatextics, all-encompassing Textics overstepping the 
minimal immense representative domain, and having as object the 
possibility of structural disclosing of elements which every structure 
that organizes them obfuscates. 21
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It is therefore not impossible that one discipline concerned tech- 
nically and up to a microscopical point with its own field may even- 
tually foresee, in its possible extensions, a questioning of any institu- 
tion from the other end. No longer by breaking ties according to a 
blind expeditious destitution, but rather, by increasing relations 
according to what would have to be called a-paradoxical- 
transtitution. 
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